

AN ARMED FORCES STAFF

by

WILLIAM G. HANNE

As a result of the experience of World War II, Congress and the President determined shortly after the war that the continuation of a national integrated military command structure was in the best interests of the United States. The lines were soon drawn, however, between those who wanted a single strongly unified military department and those who wanted separate armed services functioning in a loose coalition. The National Security Act of 1947 was basically a compromise between these two positions, and the result has been a situation in which solutions to joint problems are developed by committee, but the authority to insure compliance with subsequent decisions has been withheld.

The intent of the legislation that established the Joint Chiefs of Staff was to create a staff of senior military officers that would provide the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council with military advice and, expressly, not to create a General Staff with executive authority. In view of the almost continuous criticism of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since its establishment, however, the unstated desire apparently was to have an organization that would function as a military staff in support of the commander—the President. To support the President, and yet operate in accordance with legislative intent, the Office of the Joint Chiefs would translate presidential decisions into appropriate guidance, transmit that guidance to the forces to which it applied, and monitor the implementation of the guidance—but it would not have the executive authority needed to insure compliance.

What was the reason for the reluctance to provide the JCS with such authority? In

1947, in the wake of World War II (and the Nuremberg Trials), there was concern about the concentration of power and authority in a well-organized, armed, and disciplined body of men. Complicating the issue of military command structure, and bringing deep emotions to the surface, were the foreboding shadows of Von Moltke, the Prussian General Staff, and the German General Staff—in a phrase, “a man on a white horse.” Eleven years later, in April 1958, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Nathan Twining, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, addressed the same fears of an excessive concentration of military power that might infringe on political institutions:

A man on a white horse cannot emerge from this legislation, [General Twining said, speaking of the Reorganization Act of 1958] . . . Civilian control is clearly delineated; the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a corporate body, retain their present important powers; and numerous checks and balances will continue to exist.¹

Summarizing additional testimony from General Twining, the committee report goes on to read:

Nor would the proposed changes create in the United States, as some opponents charged, a counterpart of the ‘notorious German General Staff . . . which, by establishing control over all the armed services, was able to lead Germany down the road to military dictatorship and ruinous war.’ This view, General Twining held, was based on two misconceptions. First, Germany did not have a unified military system

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or armed forces general staff. Defeat in World Wars I and II could be largely attributed to this lack, rather than, as charged by the critics, to the existence of an armed forces staff dominated by one service at the expense of the other. Second, the German General Staff, far from taking over the German Government, was itself taken over by Hitler.²

Despite reassurances, however, the fear of "a man on a white horse" has been a repeated constraint on all proposed changes to the JCS structure. The House Armed Services Committee's response to General Twining's comments (delivered almost a month after his testimony) was perhaps more prophetic than observers realized at the time:

To support its opposition to a 'national general staff,' the committee pointed out that the very qualities that made such an organization an effective instrument for decisionmaking in combat rendered it dangerous as a formulator of national policy. Speed of decision, achieved by suppression of alternatives at every level, was the primary attribute of a general staff. This was highly desirable in battle where time was of the essence and a faulty decision was better than no decision. At top levels of government, the reverse was true. Planning should precede action by a considerable period. A deliberate decision was, therefore, infinitely preferable to a bad decision. In addition, the deliberate weighing of alternate courses of action was one of the main processes of free government.³

Under the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System that came into play nearly two years later, one might say that the "deliberate weighing of alternate courses of action" was the *only* process that the JCS has performed, as opposed to making firm decisions and insuring that all services adhered to those decisions. Eventually, the budget makers in the Office of Management and Budget and the Defense Department make the final decisions on allocation of resources and thus drive the system. But is

there a better way? More important, what is it that we want a joint staff to do?

It is perhaps an oversimplification to say that we want our armed forces to protect and defend our national interests. All too often the armed forces have become an end in themselves and have not been fully recognized as one of a number of means for achieving our national interests. If such recognition is to be attained, the military aspects of national policy need to be represented at the highest echelons within the government.⁴

To many observers, it is apparent that a group of national military advisors is indeed necessary to the effective functioning of the government. Yet others have expressed the traditional American concern that national uniformed advisors would exercise undue influence and, as the Chiefs of the services, might even react in a coup to real or imagined dangers. To realize that such fears have been quite genuine and persistent in the American psyche, one need only read the Constitution, look at appropriate congressional testimony and newspaper editorials over the years, and note the popularity of books and motion pictures like *Seven Days in May*.

The question, then, becomes one of striking a balance between the perceived needs of national security and the perceived fears of an all-powerful General Staff. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, attempted to achieve that balance by creating a joint staff structure but limiting its authority:

The Joint Staff shall not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and shall have no executive authority. The Joint Staff may be organized and may operate along conventional staff lines to support the Joint Chiefs of Staff in discharging their assigned responsibilities.⁵

It takes only a peripheral knowledge of the history of the 19th and 20th centuries to understand what is being referred to by the term "Armed Forces General Staff"—another German General Staff. But as Walter Millis noted,

The Great General Staff is dead, and no one can say that its answers for the central problems of military organization and command in a democratic-capitalistic society were the sound ones. But we can certainly profit by its example.⁶

What were these answers to the problems of military organization and command? To Millis, these "answers" were essentially traditions:

Traditions of an almost monkish divorcement of military policy from political affairs, of thorough preparatory planning for every possible military eventuality (without regard for the influence which the military plan might have on the political crisis), of corporate anonymity in planning and command but of the highest level of individual competence and responsibility within the corporate leadership, of the strictest moral and intellectual and also caste standards maintained within the framework of selfless devotion to the sovereign and the state—these were the traditions and the principles developed by the German General Staff through the Nineteenth Century as answers to the basic problems of military command in the democratic-capitalist-technological society of the time.⁷

To observers perhaps more emotional and less detached than Millis, the German General Staff represented evil and invoked the fear that a democratic nation of which any such institution were a part would always be subject to becoming its prey:

They [the German Army General Staff and High Command] have been responsible in large measure for the miseries and sufferings that have fallen upon millions of men, women, and children. They have been a disgrace to the honourable profession of arms. Without their military guidance the aggressive ambitions of Hitler and his fellow Nazis would have been academic and sterile They were certainly a ruthless military caste.⁸

Still others, such as Gordon A. Craig,

claim that the lack of "moral courage, the spiritual independence, and . . . deep patriotism"—all personal or corporate attributes as opposed to entrepreneurial characteristics—left the German General Staff powerless to avert the disaster that in essence was the result of its own political irresponsibility,⁹ the "almost monkish divorcement of military policy from political affairs" noted by Millis.

Helmut von Moltke, Chief of the Prussian General Staff from 1857 to 1888, summed up what was regarded as the military view on contention between military and political advisors. On the outbreak of war, "at the moment of mobilization," he remarked,

the political advisor [to the king] should fall silent, and should take the lead again only when the [military] strategist has informed the king, after the complete defeat of the enemy, that his task has been fulfilled.¹⁰

While Moltke, the Prussian General Staff, and Clausewitz are often assumed to have been virtually of one mind on such matters, particularly in American eyes, in reality they were not, as the following commentary by Clausewitz illustrates:

War is not an independent phenomenon, but the continuation of politics by different means. Consequently, the main lines of every major strategic plan are largely political in nature, and their political character increases the more the plan applies to the entire campaign and to the whole state. A war plan results directly from the political conditions of the two warring states, as well as from their relations to third powers. A plan of campaign results from the war plan, and frequently—if there is only one theater of operations—may even be identical with it. But the political element even enters the separate components of a campaign; rarely will it be without influence on such major episodes of warfare as a battle, etc. According to this point of view, there can be no question of a purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, nor of a purely military scheme to solve it.¹¹

The General Staff, as Clausewitz envisioned it, would be in direct support of the head of state, who would implement the military strategy in consonance with the overall national, or grand, strategy. Clausewitz's writings all contain this one constant thread of subordinating military aims to political objectives—a fact that has been overlooked frequently. His General Staff would consist of highly trained, carefully selected military generalists. Their function would be to assist the nation's leadership in planning, directing, and controlling the activities of all subordinate military elements in order to produce the most effective mutually supporting efforts possible toward achieving an assigned goal, or toward sustaining maximum readiness. Ironically, it was indeed this type of staff and military-political relationship that the Prussian reformers—Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Grolman, Boyen, and Clausewitz—wanted to establish during the early years of the 19th century, one that would fall within the constitutional limits of the political reforms then being considered in Prussia.¹² Fate or the personalities involved, however, brought about different results, and, as time passed, the General Staff became synonymous with militarism, with absolute power.

A STAFF WITHOUT EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY

Some form of high-level organization is clearly needed, not only to provide military advice on matters of national security, but also to oversee effectively the administration of defense resources. Such an organization, of course, is referred to as a "staff," and it supports the commander, whoever he may be. In the words of Clausewitz:

The General Staff is intended to convert the ideas of the General commanding into orders, not only conveying the former to the troops, but also working out all matters of detail, thus relieving the General from a great amount of trouble.¹³

Essentially, the "staff" of an organization consists of those personnel who assist the commander in the exercise of command. This assistance normally falls into one or more of the following functional areas: planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, reporting, or budgeting. It is recognized by writ, practice, and tradition that while a member of a staff has the responsibility to translate a decision of the commander into an order, issue that order to the troops, and supervise its execution, he does not possess the authority to command—the authority that the staff member carries is solely that of the commander, whom he serves as a spokesman.¹⁴

To paraphrase British economist Graham Hutton, it is one of the paradoxes of the evolution of warfare that as technology eases the physical burden associated with combat, the organization and administration made necessary by the advance of technology increase the burden of management on the commander.¹⁵ Thus, as the complexity of warfare has increased from interclan disputes to the threat of intercontinental devastation, the size of the military staff has also increased.

While the organization of the JCS is adequate in size and capability, however, the Chairman still lacks the necessary authority to direct actions. He can easily provide guidance, but when it comes to directing the use of resources, establishing priorities, and enforcing decisions, he is powerless should the individual service concerned—Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps—not

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concur. This inability of the JCS (and, by extension, the commanders-in-chief of unified commands) to exercise directive or executive authority is serious and persistent. And the problem has deep historical roots, going back even beyond the well-known dispute between the commanders of the Pacific and the Atlantic theaters for landing craft in World War II. The committee aspect of joint activities ranges from requiring the wording of Studies Analysis and Gaming Agency reports to be "blessed" by all services before they are officially released, to the inability of the Chairman to direct resolution of shortfalls in transport vehicles or sealift in existing contingency plans. With regard to the latter problem, the quest for resolution must officially originate within the particular service capable of resolving the problem (but not necessarily most adversely affected by it), and the issue must receive high enough priority to move ahead of such other service "requirements" as, say, tank modernization or carrier battle group force structure changes. This situation leads to a sense of frustration with the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and fuels the belief that "the JCS could shut down and it would be six months before anyone noticed it."

Is the JCS proof of Biller's contention that it is men who persist, that organizations are just their tools or networks to get things done? Or is it proof of the traditional postulate that while men come and go, it is the organization that persists?¹⁶

Certain characteristics have become associated with the workings of the Office of the Joint Chiefs over the years. Some of these characteristics may have had their origin in the dichotomy noted above between the stated advisory role of the JCS and the almost instinctive expectation for the Joint Staff to perform the roles of a standard staff. Three characteristics stand out.

The first is the propensity to function on a committee basis. At one time, recommendations were forwarded by the Chiefs, having been arrived at on a majority-rule basis, with dissenting views appended. Such recommendations too frequently not only

failed to fully resolve the problem under consideration, but passed it upward for resolution—possibly a resolution that brought to bear far less expertise than that generated by the JCS themselves, and also possibly a resolution satisfactory to no one. Now recommendations at least give the appearance of a resolved problem, but perhaps it is only the appearance, in that they are generally based on a "lowest-common-denominator" approach to resolution (a position on the issue at hand that may not propound the most feasible solution from an objective standpoint, but one that can at least be tacitly supported by all the services). In itself, the resort to a "lowest common denominator" is not necessarily a negative feature (without it, some problems might even be insoluble), but such resort should be infrequent.

A second characteristic is the tendency for orientation on mid- or long-term problems. With the growing significance of the battle of the defense budget, the problems and the issues before the JCS become those related to roles, missions, functions, and allocation of Five-Year Defense Plan resources. Essentially, many of these problems will be resolved through the budgetary process and thus will permit more flexibility than do problems of a more immediate nature, such as the reallocation of shortages among competing unified commands.

A third characteristic has been the tacit development of an "incestuous" relationship between the service staffs and the JCS staff. More specifically, JCS papers are staffed within service staffs by those action officers who are also normally charged with the responsibility to prepare or support their own service's position.

These are not new observations. From the beginning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concept in 1942, participants and observers alike predicted that an organization similar to the one that has evolved would have such characteristics. Since 1947 there have been at least 13 reorganization actions taken with a view toward addressing these and other less than satisfactory characteristics of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. An analysis of these actions indicates that they fall into three major categories.

The first of these categories encompasses proposals that were largely directed by the President, and on which action was taken. Made between 1947 and 1958, these proposals had as their objective one or both of the following:

- Centralization of authority.
- Delineation of a responsive chain-of-command for the unified and specified commands.

The second category comprises proposals more drastic in nature that were made by panels (or groups) formed at the request of the President or the Secretary of Defense, and on which no significant action was taken. Made between 1970 and 1980, these proposals had as their objective one or more of the following:

- Increased civilian control, particularly of the unified and specified commands.
- Centralization of authority.
- Improvement of JCS-related actions in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System cycle.
- Increased responsiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency in the conduct of operations.

The third category embraces internal actions that stemmed from reports or recommendations originating within the organization of the Joint Chiefs between 1962 and 1978. These JCS-initiated actions were all within the framework of then-existing legislation and thus did not require congressional approval. Key among these actions were efforts to free the Chiefs from having to address all but the most critical JCS-related issues:

- Numerous committees, councils, agencies, and groups (normally outside the manpower limitation figure of the Office of the Joint Chiefs) were created to explore issues and develop positions for possible JCS adoption.
- The Chiefs of the services were directed by the Defense Department to divest themselves of many service-related functions

and hand them over to their Vice Chiefs of Staff.

- Operations deputies were created and invested with the authority to make routine JCS decisions.

There were several additional characteristics of the internal reorganization decisions of this period. Among these characteristics were:

- Growth and expansion of the JCS organization over the long term (1962 to 1975).
- Shrinkage of the organization within a compressed period of time (1975 to 1976).
- Realignment of functions and responsibilities during periods of growth and expansion, followed by gradual piecemeal elimination of functions and responsibilities during the 1975-76 period of personnel reductions.¹⁷

In sum, most of the recommendations and actions to date have sought to fine-tune the existing organization, with a decided effort not to create either an executive function for the JCS or a situation in which the roles of each service, as viewed by that service, would be brought into question.

The development of the JCS as an advisory body seems to have had as its basis a long-held American predisposition to believe that there is but one answer to every problem and it is readily apparent to all sincere intelligent persons. Applied directly to the JCS, this view would have it that the thorough study of any problem by a committee of professionals will soon render a single best solution.

The shortcomings of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in its performance of a less than ideal role, are systemic, human, and perceptual in nature. They are systemic in that not only is a consensus position sought, but a JCS position paper is handled at service-staff level by the same persons or same agency tasked to prepare that service's position for the Chief of Staff—a case, perhaps, in which the institution is run by the inmates. The shortcomings have a human element, in that the role of personality is significant. Recent history is replete with Service Secretaries, Chiefs of Staff, and

Defense Department officials who have left their imprint—via their personality—on the system. On occasion, that imprint, or subsequent reaction to it, has served to distort the system. Finally, the organization's shortcomings have a perceptual dimension, although the extent to which this is the case is difficult to determine. Perhaps the JCS system really *is* working, and what are seen as major deficiencies of the system are only the unsolved segments of much larger problems that have been, for the most part, already put to rest—if the JCS has solved 95 percent of a problem, the remaining five percent of the problem then becomes not only visible, but magnified. This five percent might bear upon national survival, in which case it demands instant attention by the Joint Chiefs. On the other hand, it might be of relatively little consequence but assume a disproportionate weight because it is the only part of the problem left to be seen. In this latter case, attempts to fine-tune that visible five percent may involve investments of time, money, and manpower in excess of the potential benefits to be gained.

If this perceptual appraisal is valid, then there is no problem. The JCS is as efficient as it can be, barring the incremental improvements possible in all human endeavors. Thus, the JCS should obviously remain as it is structured.

If there is an inadequate correlation between ends and means within the national military structure, however, then a solution might be to reorganize or restructure in order to develop the desired capabilities. Whatever the solution, it clearly should be based on the requirements of the nation. Two fairly recent studies suggested divergent solutions to the problem. The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (1970) recommended an Assistant Secretary of Defense (Operations) as the authority overseeing the defense agencies and the commands, leaving the JCS as primary advisors to the National Command Authority. The Steadman Report (1978) recommended leaving the JCS as structured but creating a group of senior military officials known as the National Military Advisors and having them function in-

dependently of the JCS as the principal advisors to the President.

Perhaps these study groups, as well as those before them, have applied the old philosophic rule known as "Ockham's razor"—when confronted with a complex problem and competing complex possible solutions, it is advisable to select the least complex of the solutions. With this problem, everyone's solution has been to centralize decisionmaking authority in the apparent belief that such an approach will both simplify the issue and be responsive.¹⁸ The many solutions offered have also accepted as a given the legislative removal of the power of executive authority from the JCS. While public concerns about an all-powerful General Staff are not without foundation, the need to have a staff that can nevertheless act in the name of the President to implement presidential policy and strategy decisions and provide the Commander-in-Chief accurate risk assessments is quite real. The critical question remains, what type of staff permits both adequate civilian control and military responsiveness?

TWO RESPONSIBILITIES, TWO STAFFS

One can consider the term "staff" from a number of vantage points. The traditional viewpoint varies from service to service, of course, and is based on individual service experience, history, and needs. From a managerial perspective, a staff is organized and operated to reflect functional responsibilities; a political view insures that there are adequate checks and balances to preclude any one party from accruing too much power; and the historical outlook is, "We'll do it this way because we've always done it this way."

In developing a more workable staff concept, I would propose an approach that pays heed to the particular long-term nature of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System cycle and the lasting effect of decisions related to that cycle but also meets the need for responsiveness and effectiveness on the operations side. What is required is a structure that permits roles,

functions, and long-range procurement to be handled in a sector distinctly apart from the immediate military implementation of national strategy. To that end, I propose a concept of two distinct but interrelated staffs.

The diagram on the next page sketches the outlines of this concept. While it is recognized that the structure depicted is quite different from the current organization, as well as being a concept that could cause congressional concern, it is offered as one way to solve the problem of the lack of executive authority in the JCS with a sense of balance and moderation.

This proposal does away with the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff altogether. The four Chiefs themselves would serve as full members of the National Security Council (along with the Secretary of Defense) and also, of course, function as Chiefs of their services.

The national policies and strategies developed by the National Security Council and approved by the President would be addressed in their mid- and long-term implications by the *Department of Defense Staff*, with the Secretary of Defense and the four service Chiefs together providing direction. The activities of this staff would focus on manning, equipping, training, and modernizing the forces (with the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System as a key point of reference).


Directly under the President, an *Armed Forces Staff* would be created to develop military strategy, transmit presidential orders to the unified and specified commands, and supervise the execution of those orders. The chief of the Armed Forces Staff would be junior to the Chiefs of Staff, and his appointment would be subject to confirmation by the Senate. The Armed Forces Staff would also be charged with reporting to the President and to the National Security Council on the state of readiness and capability of each unified or specified command to execute national military strategy and with advising on the degree of risk associated with strategies under consideration. The Armed Forces Staff would func-

tion in the traditional manner of a staff and would exercise executive authority granted to it by the President and the Congress.

The result would be that two different organizations, responding to separate and distinct sets of circumstances and time requirements, would be part of the National Military Command structure. One—the Department of Defense Staff, including the Chiefs of Staff—would respond to mid- and long-term requirements and would be able to focus on the development of forces needed to support long-range national strategies. The second—the Armed Forces Staff—would focus on immediate problems and the operational requirements for carrying out contingency plans or crisis action plans related to the national strategy. Both staffs would receive their guidance from one authority, the President, and from one policymaking body, the National Security Council, permitting both conceptual unity of effort and a clear link between ends and means. Military counsel would be heard, not filtered, and military authorities charged by oath of office to carry out the orders of the President would know that military counsel had been provided and duly considered in the President's decisions.

This proposal rests on the recognition that national strategy must support the national interest, and that military strategy must support national strategy. It also takes into account the differences between the demands of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System and the demands of operational requirements. In addition, the proposed reorganization considers the differences between "advisory" and "staff" functions. Civilian control is paramount, and a system of checks and balances is present to insure that civilian control remains in effect. Under this concept, military policies and strategies are based on national policies and strategies, rather than the reverse.

The creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was intended to establish a body that would give the best possible military advice to the President and Secretary of Defense. As time passed and reorganizations and restructuring



- Chiefs of Staff, on NSC, would serve as National Military Advisors to the President. There would be no single spokesman in a "purple suit."
- Armed Forces Staff would contain current OJCS committees. DIA and NSA would also respond to the Armed Forces Staff.
- Armed Forces Staff would keep President and NSC apprised of readiness (including shortfalls) and of the ability of the commands to execute national military strategies.
- NSC, at the direction of the President, would direct reconciliation of shortfalls. Options would range from reallocation of resources to realignment of national priorities, policies, and objectives.
- Defense Staff would focus on mid- to long-range planning (PPBS). Armed Forces Staff would focus on near-term planning (JOPS). Plans would be consolidated in the NSC.

took place, an inferred role of the staff, but one without executive authority, came into focus. Further, with the growth of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System role, an apparent split evolved between the inferred need to oversee the unified and specified commands and the mid- to long-range planning, programming, and budgeting responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs.

The creation of an Armed Forces Staff and the other changes that have been recommended here would solve these problems. This proposal recognizes the difference between the demands and

requirements of the unified and specified commands and those of the individual services. It also takes into account the difference between the advisory and staff roles. The proposed structure of two staffs would establish a cleaner, more efficient line of command between the President and the unified and specified commands, it would allow the Department of Defense Staff and the Service Chiefs to concentrate far more on mid- and long-term planning, and it would enhance the advisory role of the Chiefs of Staff to the President and the National Security Council.

NOTES

1. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chronology: Functions and Composition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (Washington: US Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1979), pp. 149-50.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 128-29.
3. Andre Beaufre, *Strategy for Tomorrow* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1974), p. 71.
4. To quote Clausewitz:

If war is to be fully consonant with political objectives, and policy suited to the means available for war, then unless statesman and soldier are combined in one person, the only sound expedient is to make the commander-in-chief a member of the cabinet, so that the cabinet can share in the major aspects of his activities.

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976), p. 608.

5. "Joint Chiefs of Staff," *US Code, Title 10—Armed Forces*, ch. 5, sec. 143(d). Emphasis added.

6. Walter Millis in Walter Goerlitz, *History of the German General Staff: 1657-1945* (New York: Praeger, 1953), p. x.

7. *Ibid.*, p. vii.

8. Matthew Cooper, *The German Army: 1933-1945* (London: Macdonald and Jane's, 1978), p. 3.

9. Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army: 1640-1945* (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1955), p. 503.

10. Michael Howard, "Introductory Essay," in *On War*, p. 31.

11. Peter Paret, "Introductory Essay," in *On War*, p. 7.

12. T. N. Dupuy, *A Genius for War* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), pp. 17-48.

13. Quoted in Bronsart von Schellendorff, *The Duties of the General Staff* (London: Harrison and Sons, 1905), p. 3.

14. James D. Little, *The Military Staff* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1961), pp. 3-4.

15. Ernest Dale and Lyndall Urwick, *Staff in Organization* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 1.

16. US Army War College, *Army Command and Management: Theory and Practice* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army War College, 1980), pp. 23-24.

17. The situation involving the structure, organization, and functions of the JCS has evolved to the point that if the President and the National Security Council want advice on the related military strategy and military implications of a national manpower strategy, the response would come from OASD (M&RA) since there is no longer a J-1 within the JCS. At the same time, rectification of operational shortfalls in equipment related to the implementation of contingency plans of any unified or specified command has no real sponsor within the JCS.

18. Decisions in the nuclear era have been so important and potentially dangerous that national policymakers, quite understandably, have desired close control over military forces. Concurrently, advances in communications techniques have supported that centralization.

